The disaster myopia hypothesis is a theoretical argument that may explain why crises are a recurrent event. Under very optimistic circumstances, investors disregard any relevant information concerning the increasing degree of risk. Agents' propensity to underestimate the probability of adverse outcomes from the distant past increases the longer the period since that event occurred and at some point the subjective probability attached to this event reaches zero. This risky behaviour may contribute to the formation of a bubble that bursts into a crisis. This paper tests whether there is evidence of disaster myopia during the recent episode of financial crisis in the banking sector. Its contribution is twofold. First, it shows that the 2007 financial crisis exhibits disaster myopia in the banking sector. And second, it identifies macro and specific determinant variables in banks' risk taking since the beginning of the years 2000.
Introduction
The disaster myopia hypothesis has been introduced by Guttentag and Herring (1986) to explain why crises are a recurrent event. Under very optimistic circumstances, investors disregard any relevant information concerning the increasing degree of risk. Agents' propensity to underestimate the probability of adverse outcomes from the distant past increases the longer the period since that event occurred and at some point the subjective probability attached to this event reaches zero. This paper tests whether there is evidence of disaster myopia during the recent episode of financial crisis in the banking sector.
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crisis. Without denying the effects of the aforementioned factors, this paper suggests that current financial crisis also has its roots in the disaster myopia of market participants and especially banks.
Disaster myopia has been used to explain the LDC debt crisis, the US savings and loans debacle and various commercial property crises.
1 Although Haldane (2009) and Herring (2008) interpret the recent financial crisis as a consequence of disaster myopia and argue that disaster myopia has been one of its predominating factors, there is no empirical test of this hypothesis. In this paper, we precisely empirically test whether the 2007 illiquidity shock can be considered as a myopiainduced disaster by analyzing the (decreasing) risk perception of banks over the period preceding the occurrence of the crisis.
To measure disaster myopia, we focus on risk taking dynamics. Bank risk-taking may be measured by several manners in the literature. First, as in Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) , Esty (1998) , and Grossman and Imai (2010) , among others, one can use the volatility of share prices (this corresponds to computing the standard deviation of monthly changes in share prices for a given year for each bank, which is matched up with annual data on bank liability characteristics).
2 Three other measures of risk-taking from bank balance sheets are also used: the ratio of loans to total assets, the ratio of cash to total assets, and the rate of growth of assets. The assumption is that loans are riskier and less liquid-and that cash is less risky and more liquid-than other balance sheet assets, primarily securities. Banks with substantial contingent liabilities should have a smaller proportion of their assets in loans and a larger proportion of their assets in cash than limited liability banks if the risk-reducing incentive of contingent liability is strong. Risk-taking can also be measured by the rate at which a bank's assets expand in a given year under the theory that, all other things being equal, banks that engage in riskier activities will grow more rapidly than banks behaving in a more conservative manner (Calomiris 1990 , Grossman 2001 , 2007 .
In this paper, we consider the maturity mismatch in banks' balance sheets as an indicator of risk taking in the banking sector. 3 Indeed, as Diamond and Rajan (2009) and Fahri and Tirole (2009, p. 2) suggest, the current crisis "is one of wide-scale maturity mismatch". More precisely, we look at the distortions in the maturities in banks' balance sheets by considering the share of liquid assets compared to long term liabilities. Maturity mismatches accepted by banks make them vulnerable to acute liquidity risk. We focus on the banking sector as this problem was even more acute because of the interaction between accounting rules and prudential norms (Basel II). During economic 1 For example, Herring (1986) and Herring (1999) .
2 This measure has several limitations. First, some banks are privately owned, and thus their shares are not traded. Second, even when banks are publicly traded, shares are not transacted every month, presumably because these shares are not especially liquid.
3 Note here that maturity mismatch is not used in its traditional sense. Chang and Velasco (1998) , Goldfajn and Valdes (1999) and others have argued that foreign asset-liability mismatches in the East Asian economies was an "inevitable" consequence of international financial intermediation. See also Bird and Rajan (2001) . Here, we simply consider that if banks perceived a low risk, they had a tendency to have a wide maturity mismatch, while when they perceived high risk on the market, they tended to reduce the mismatch.
slowdowns, default rates increase, asset prices decrease, which generates losses for banks that reduce their capital. Simultaneously because of prudential norms, the requirements for capital increase.
Therefore, as capital is reduced and the need for capital is increased, there necessarily is a contraction in credit offer.
In terms of methodology, we use a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model as the study of disaster myopia refers to a dynamic process. Indeed, we study to what extent the lagged values of the risk taking variables influence the current value of this variable. The GMM shows first that risk taking in period t is influenced by risk taking in period t-1 at least, and second that there is a set of variables -specific to the banking sector as the size, profitability, vulnerability, but also to the economic and financial environment-that determine risk taking. The main result of the paper is that the disaster myopia hypothesis is relevant to understand the current financial crisis. Regressions The article is organized as follows. The next section describes the considered conceptual framework of disaster myopia. Section III presents the data, the methodology used to test the theory and justifies the choice of variables. Section IV establishes test results. Section V discusses the policy implications of evidence of disaster myopia and section VI concludes.
II.

Conceptual framework: the disaster myopia hypothesis
Guttentag and Herring 4 analyze the decision making process of investors under uncertainty. Disaster myopia is a situation in which agents tend to underestimate the probability of adverse outcomes. Such a behaviour is especially overriding for small probability events from a distant past. The authors use cognitive psychology 5 to build their reasoning. According to this approach, economic agents base their decisions rules on rough heuristic or rules of thumb. The closest conceptual approach is that of Herring (1998) ; in this section, we present a simplified and slightly modified version of it. We first describe the context, before presenting the disaster myopia hypothesis and the institutional factors that may give rise to such a behavior. This framework enables us to state our tested hypotheses.
2.1. Uncertainty, objective and subjective risk probabilities
In an uncertain environment, individuals use subjective probabilities. A subjective probability is a personal judgment concerning the likelihood of the occurrence of a particular event. Individuals do not use precise computation but base their judgment on a reasonable assessment. A person's subjective probability of an event describes his/her degree of belief in the event. There is no formal calculation, but past experiences are very important to form these probabilities. At the opposite, objective probabilities estimate the occurrence of an event based on a recorded observation, rather than a subjective estimate.
On the one hand, the "availability heuristic" -which refers to the ease with which a decision maker can imagine that an event will occur-rests on the fact that the longer the period since an event occurred, the lower the subjective probability attached to it.
On the other hand, below a certain threshold, this subjective probability sets at zero. This is the "threshold heuristic": it exacerbates the bias toward the underestimation of shock probabilities.
More precisely, threshold heuristic is the rule of thumb by which decision markers devote scarce management time to analyze these probabilities.
Disaster myopia
The ease with which a decision maker can imagine that an event will occur rests on the fact that the longer the period since an event occurred, the lower the subjective probability attached to it (Figure 1 ). If the period without major shocks is sufficiently long, then subjective probabilities are validated over time and converge toward fully-rational objective probabilities. In such an environment, investors completely disregard information, they have a strong risk appetite since they believe that the Second, underestimation of risk has consequences for the risks facing both individual firms and for the system as a whole. For the system as a whole, one way of illustrating the consequences of underestimating risk is to translate it into "fair value" insurance premia. Haldane (2009, p. 9) illustrates risk under pricing on a dramatic scale:
'The degree of under-pricing of risk is large and is larger for options designed to protect against tail risks (lower strike prices). For at-the-money options on UK equities, the insurance premium would have been under-priced by around 45%; for options well out-of-the-money -say, 50% below equity prices at the time-the mis-pricing would have been nearer 90%'.
Among the other institutional factors mentioned by Herring (2008), we can find: the recognition of fees upfront as income, the bonuses tied to current revenues, the high job mobility among risk takers, the intense competition in financial markets that drives out participants who are not disaster myopic and the appearance of high profitability attracting new entrants. For more details, see Herring (2002) who already identified these institutional factors as a potential source of disaster myopia.
Hypotheses to be tested: disaster myopia in the banking sector
It is particularly relevant to identify bank's myopia not only because the banking sector was at the core of the recent financial disaster but also because exposures in this sector grow so large that they can jeopardize the financial system (for systemic risk analysis during the 2007 financial crisis, see for instance Bullard et al. (2009) ). Identifying and limiting the impact of the banking sector's disaster myopia is helpful to limit consequences for the system as a whole. So based on the former conceptual framework, we propose to test the following two hypotheses:
(i) the influence of the macroeconomic and financial context on the one hand and banking sector related financial variables on the other hand on banks' risk taking dynamics;
(ii) the existence of disaster myopia in the banking sector during the recent financial crisis.
III. Testing the disaster myopia hypothesis: the empirical model
This section presents the database constructed owing to Bankscope, IFS and OECD data. Our study is based on a sample of 7,360 banks from 151 countries over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . After describing the methodology used to test the disaster myopia hypothesis, the choice of macroeconomic and banking variables is justified.
The GMM model
In a first time, a GMM estimator on a large sample and small periods is used in order to underline the dynamic of the bank risk-taking during the 2000's. In a second step, a regression in cross-section and in panel focuses on the 2007 episode. Its purpose is to highlight the presence of disaster myopia phenomenon during the 2007 crisis.
As the study of disaster myopia refers to a dynamic process, we must study to what extent the lagged values of the indicator of risk taking and the initial banking, financial and real conditions influence the current value of risk taking. The starting point for this analysis is a simple regression using the endogenous lagged variable as well as the explanatory variables in t and t-1. When the ordinary least squares estimator is used for this purpose, there is a problem of correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term due to individual effects, which then gives rise to an upward bias. The within estimator enables us to eliminate this problem by integrating fixed effects and allows us to take into account institutions specificities. Nevertheless, in the context of our analysis, there is a limited number of periods, which produces a significant correlation between the dependent lagged variable and the error term. Therefore, the use of this estimator is also biased, but in the opposite direction. Given the problems encountered by these two methods, it is advisable to use a dynamic model allowing for the introduction of instrumental variables. These variables are correlated to the halshs-00617127, version 1 -26 Aug 2011
lagged value of the endogenous variable and not with the error term of the model (for t =2, 3, …, T), which solves our problem. The effects of the explanatory exogenous variables on the explained variable can then be interpreted (Arellano and Bond, 1991) . Hence, the GMM seems to be the best adapted method for our estimation. It should be noted that Blundell and Bond's (1998) Monte Carlo simulations showed that the system GMM estimator is more efficient than the first-differenced one.
Indeed when the number of instruments is small and when there is a finite sample, the first-differenced GMM estimator is biased. It should also be noted that in order to validate the use of a GMM model, the estimated coefficient of the dependent lagged variable must be larger than that of the within estimator and smaller than that of the OLS estimator. Our model can be written as follows: 
Data and justification of the choice of variables
The dependent variable is a measure of risk taking defined by the ratio: Concerning the explanatory variables, we distinguish between the banking sector and other macro variables, which are described in Table 1. halshs-00617127, version 1 -26 Aug 2011 Low volatilities may increase incentives for banks to take on more risk for behavioral, contractual or institutional reasons (Brunnermeier, 2001 , Rajan, 2005 . gdp GDP growth rate (+) Economic growth. According to the 'paradox of tranquillity' (Minsky, 1982) , the fragilities were masked by the success of the economy and the economic agents benefit from new growth opportunities. Barrell et al. (2010) ).
-Smaller banks have more risky balance sheets (Kashyap and Stein, 2000) . Small banks are pushed towards higher risktaking due to fiercer competition (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2005) . npl Nonperforming loans (Impaired Loans (NPLs)/ Gross Loans %) (+/-) Vulnerability, credit risk The mortgage expansion is accompanied by an increase in NPLs masked by the house prices growth (Claessens et al., 2010) .
Bank risk-taking increases as bank shareholders' power rises in corporate governance (Laeven and Levine, 2009 ).
i. The annual realized volatility is measured by the standard error of the daily returns for each month and thus for each year. The realized volatility is well adapted in the case of high-frequency data. It is an ex-post nonparametric and unbiased volatility estimator (Andersen et al., 2006 (Andersen et al., , 2009 and represents an unbiased indicator that makes it possible to get close to the true volatility and is largely accepted in the asset price volatility modeling and forecasting literature (Chan et al., 2009) .
ii. The Netincome variable is taken in logarithm.
IV. Results
For The panel is unbalanced in the sense that we have more observations on some banks than on others. The OLS and the Within-group estimators are biased in opposite direction but the use of the GMM estimation is validated because the coefficient of the estimated lagged dependent variable is higher than that of the Within-group estimator and lower than that of the OLS estimator. In all cases, the Hansen tests of over-identifying restrictions validate the instruments used in the model. The table shows different signs for different lags, we take the sum of coefficients to determine the overall sign.
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After checking the validity of our estimations, we can now state our results. First, we observe that risk taking in period t is influenced by risk taking in period t-1, t-2, but not always in t-3. Risk taking in period t is affected by overall risk taking in the three previous years (in table 2 the sum of the coefficients L.risk, L2.risk, L3.risk is positive and significant). The closer we get to period t, the higher the influence of the former period risk taking.
Second, as explained above, we control the analysis for the following variables: volatility, housing prices, economic growth, industrialized vs. developing countries, non-performing loans, net income of banks, return on average equity, return on average asset, and prudential ratio.
On the one hand, our results underline the influence of the economic and financial context on banks' risk taking. We observe that the lower the volatility in period t, the higher is risk taking in period t (and t, t-1) (vol). The rationale for such result is that when volatility is low, banks are incited to take on more risks which increases the share of short term assets (dependent variable denominator).
Hence our results are in line with the theoretical analysis of Brunnermeier (2001) and Rajan (2005) .
The procyclical behavior of volatilities is a concrete manifestation of the influence on risk perceptions.
By contrast, the stronger growth, the higher is risk taking (gdp): as output grows there are more yield opportunities and economic agents search for new investment opportunities. Controlling for housing prices, we also observe a positive relationship: as housing prices rise, risk taking increases (prices).
This demonstrates that economic agents and financial institutions try to benefit from a bubble, as suggested by the rational bubbles phenomenon of Blanchard and Watson (1983) . According to them, rational bubbles may yield multiple equilibria that can explain deviations from the fundamentals and the existence of self-sustaining dynamics. Comparing industrialized to developing countries, we observe that risk taking is higher in the former (region). One interpretation might be that emerging countries have drawn the lessons from previous crises, especially owing to prudential policies implemented in these countries, such as controlling entrance of short term capital inflows and managing the illiquidity risk in the banking sector. Another prominent view (Bernanke (2005) ) is that an excess of saving over investment in emerging market countries, eased financial conditions and exerted significant downward pressure on world interest rates. In so doing, this flow of saving helped to fuel a credit boom and risk-taking in major advanced economies, particularly in the United States.
Over the long run (t, t-1), low interest rates generate high risk taking. The idea is to consider that monetary policy could have contributed to the crisis. Low interest rates affect valuations, incomes and cash flows, which in turn can influence how banks measure risk Shin, 2009a, b, Borio and Zhu, 2008) . Lower interest rates, for instance, boost asset and collateral values as well as incomes and profits, which in turn can reduce risk perceptions and/or increase risk tolerance. In this respect our results converge toward those of Altunbas et al. (2010) who empirically analyze the relationship between monetary policy and risk-taking by banks using a sample of 1,100 European and US banks.
They find evidence that relative changes in banks' risk-attitude (i.e. comparing risky versus less risky banks as perceived by the market) are linked to monetary policy even in a period of subdued risk perception. More precisely, unusually low interest rates over an extended period of time contributed to an increase in bank' risk.
On the other hand, the specific bank variables play a role in the risk taking dynamics. At the banks' scale, the higher net income, the lower is risk taking (netincome). This result underlines the fact that smaller banks are induced to take more risk. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that those banks hold less liabilities compared to bigger ones, and so the share of short term assets relatively to long term liabilities is smaller. Indeed, smaller banks generally have less liquid balance sheets (lower ratios of securities to assets) (Kashyap et al. (2000) ). The lower the return (roae for return on average equity and), the higher is risk taking, indicating that banks search for yield. Low returns on investments, such as government (risk-free) securities, may increase incentives for banks to take on more risk to meet a nominal return target (Young et al., 2010) . The higher market capitalization (marketkp), the higher is risk taking. The more banks' capitalization is concentrated, the more banks take risks. Indeed, the less a bank has shareholders, the more risks it takes; such a behavior can be associated with a specific management mode of slightly capitalized banks. According to Laeven and Levine (2009) , bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of banks. Finally, the higher prudential ratio, the lower is risk taking (totcap), which suggests that macro-policy tends to reduce risk on a global basis. Finally, the lower the amount of non-performing loans, the higher should be risk taking, indicating that banks' vulnerability tends to reduce maturity mismatch (npl). The mortgage expansion is accompanied by an increase in NPLs masked by the house prices growth (Claessens et al. (2010) ).
This variable is only significant for the GMM system. We cannot therefore make a definitive conclusion.
Testing the disaster myopia hypothesis: the particular case of 2007 and previous years
To test the disaster myopia hypothesis, we resort to two types of estimations: cross-section and crosssection with country dummies. We consider two periods of time: starting from 2009 backward and starting from 2007 backward. We observe that results converge for any of the two methods (Tables 3   and 4) .
halshs-00617127, version 1 -26 Aug 2011 We can thus conclude that the episode of the 2007 crisis shows evidence of banks' myopia disaster. This result is in accordance with the aforementioned GMM results.
V. Discussion about policy implications
As regulators and institutions are more immune to disaster myopia 7 , they must design stress scenarios integrating extreme events and impose them to financial institutions. Regulators must also consider more deeply models used by financial institutions, in particular the historical statistics series used to estimate risks. All this can be done via prudential supervision accompanied by measures of transparency.
Prudential supervision
Preventing the development of financial conditions that are vulnerable to crisis is the role of prudential supervision. More precisely, prudential supervision should help identify vulnerable banks before they become weak banks and especially banks that are becoming heavily exposed to a major shock. The recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision go in this direction.
According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (hereafter BCBS) (2009a), stress tests should be performed for different risk types including market, credit, operational and liquidity risk. According to Haldane (2009) , the evaluation of the degree of risk -the value at risk for the private sector and the stress-tests for the public one-was based on data and assumptions relative to the Golden Era. This period is characterized by a strikingly low volatility from an historical perspective inducing a low degree of risk that conduced to disaster myopia. Using British historical data -back in some cases to the 17 th century-Haldane shows that the low macroeconomic and financial volatility level during this Golden Era has been without historical equivalent. As a result, this lack of historical perspective to assess the risk level has led to disaster myopia. According to Haldane (2009) intend to limit risk. The liquidity coverage ratio is also useful in this respect, as it identifies the amount of unencumbered, high quality liquid assets an institution holds that can be used to offset the net cash outflows it would encounter under an acute short-term stress scenario specified by supervisors. The net stable funding ratio measures the amount of longer-term, stable sources of funding employed by an institution relative to the liquidity profiles of the assets funded and the potential for contingent calls on funding liquidity arising from off-balance sheet commitments and obligations. The standard requires a minimum amount of funding that is expected to be stable over a one year time horizon based on liquidity risk factors assigned to assets and off-balance sheet liquidity exposures. This ratio is intended to promote longer-term structural funding of banks' balance sheets, off-balance sheet exposures and capital markets activities. To deal with banks' liquidity risk, the Committee also proposes that banks should frequently conduct a contractual maturity mismatch assessment.
Announcements and transparency
In parallel, policy-makers may attempt to avert a financial crisis by announcing policies that will reduce the likelihood of a disaster or mitigate its impact. For example, the development of indicators of increasing vulnerability to financial crises could provide a useful counter to disaster myopia.
Macroprudential indicators may help deter disaster myopia.
Factors that encourage disaster myopia should also be dealt with. Opaque accounting practices, which obscure the magnitude of the exposure of the consolidated financial institution or mask deterioration in the market value of exposures, are a fundamental source of vulnerability. Exante public disclosure of exposures to credit risk may exercise some constraining influence.
VI. Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is twofold. disaster myopia is the starting point. In terms of economic policy, there is a need for advances in modelling credit risk and greater discipline of the pricing of credit risk. Identifying and limiting the impact of the banking sector's disaster myopia is helpful as it may limit the consequences for the system as a whole. Indeed, because of the particular and systemic role of banks in the financing of the economy, the impact of banking sector myopia on the economy may grow so large that they can jeopardize the financial system.
An open question for future research is whether disaster myopia is more prominent during the recent financial crisis than during previous financial distresses. More precisely, is the current financial crisis special in this respect? We expect the disaster myopia problem to be more acute today because of the complexity and opacity of new financial products. 
VII.
A -Summary
